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nancial economics is why fund managers invest in
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1 Introduction
One of the most puzzling results in nancial economics is why fund managers invest
in short-maturity assets even though they could obtain larger prots in assets with
longer maturity.1 This puzzle may become particularly important as long as the large
recurrence of this phenomenon may eventually a¤ect the equilibrium prices in nancial
markets. In this paper, we propose an explanation for this puzzling behavior based
mainly upon two facts. First, during the last decades institutional investors have in-
creased dramatically their participation in the nancial system.2 Consequently, it is
reasonable to conjecture that labor contracts signed by this class of investors and their
managers may play an important role as determinants of the stock pricesdynamics.
Second, there is a recent evidence supporting the fact that young managers exhibit a
clear bias in favor of short-maturity securities. This suggests the usefulness of con-
sidering a theoretical framework in which decisions on investment maturity may be
driven by an age-based agent heterogeneity.
We combine these two facts in a career concern-based model in which the institu-
tional investor (the principal) designs an optimal contract that considers both explicit
and implicit incentives of two class of funds managers (the agents): young and old
traders. While the former is a trader who cares about how the current performance
a¤ect his future compensation, the latter is a trader without career concerns. The
major prediction of our model is that, under certain conditions, this optimal contract
leads the young (old) managers to prefer short-maturity (long-maturity) investments.
Under the career concerns set-up, the intuition behind this result is quite simple. Since
the history of old tradersperformance have already been revealed, the principals pre-
diction about their ability is better than that made when they are young. This implies
that a young trader has to show good returns in the short-run in order to improve the
principals belief about his ability, and to increase both the probability of being retained
and his future compensation. As a consequence, he ends up selecting short-maturity
assets less protable than the long-maturity ones.
The main implication of our model is that this investment maturity bias may even-
tually explain some episodes of stock price overreactions observed in practice.3 This
means therefore that our setting is able to shed light on a very relevant nancial puz-
zle by characterizing an interesting and so far unexplored link between both the labor
market and the nancial market.
1See Chevalier and Ellison (1999).
2For instance, in the New York Stock Exchange, the percentage of outstanding corporate equity
held by institutional investors has increased from 7,2% in 1950 to 49,8% in 2002 (NYSE Factbook
2003).
3See Dasgupta and Prat (2005).
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Furthermore, we extend our model by performing a sensibility analysis of the results
when we include both career-risk concerns - how the agents current performance
a¤ects the variability of his future compensation - and multitask analysis. Under
the assumption that implicit incentives are strong and the presence of an information
collection e¤ort, we observe that both young and old managers prefer to invest in long-
maturity assets. In addition, both kind of traders choose the same contract when the
ratio of variances of long-maturity to short-maturity assets increases. The intuition
of this result is that the higher the career-risk concerns, the smaller the information
collection e¤ort level. As a consequence, the mutual funds owner may nd optimal
to increase the managers pay-for-performance sensitivity, leading young managers to
adopt bolder positions in favor of securities with long maturity.
Our work is in connection with plenty of literature, both theoretical and applied
one. For instance, one of the works that supports empirically the fund managers
preferences for short-maturity positions is that of Chevalier and Ellison (1999). They
nd that young fund managers are more risk averse in selecting their portfolios -
by choosing short-maturity securities - than the old ones, even though in this way,
they obtain less prots by comparison with what they could get holding more mature
assets. Furthermore, their results suggest a nonlinear relationship between managerial
turnover and mutual funds performance. This means that for young traders the
managerial turnover is more performance-sensitive than the old ones, which leads to
a U-shape in the relationship between managerial turnover and traders performance.
Chevalier and Ellison explain this fact through the di¤erences in the career concerns
among them. In this way, as well as Dutta and Reichelsen (2003) and Sabac (2006),
our work tries to explain theoretically this empirical evidence through the di¤erences
in the pay-for-performance sensitivity between young and old managers.
A large literature in economics and nance have studied the determinants of the
executive compensation contracts. Nevertheless, only a minority part has focused on
how the implicit incentives of the fund managers a¤ect the design of these contracts,
and through this, the investment maturity decisions. The exceptions are Gibbons and
Murphy (1992), Meyer and Vickers (1997), Dutta and Reichelsen (2003), Christensen
et al. (2005) and Sabac (2006). All of these works study how optimal contracts includ-
ing managers career concerns can explain the aforementioned nonlinear managerial
turnover-performance relationship for young and old managers. In general, this litera-
ture analyzes dynamic settings with short-term contracts based on the career concerns
model developed by Holmström (1999). For instance, Gibbons and Murphy (1992)
assume that the principals bargaining power is null, i.e. that the principals expected
surplus is zero in equilibrium. On the contrary, Meyer and Vickers (1997) develop a
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model in which the bargaining power is on the principals hands, i.e. in equilibrium
the agents certainty equivalent is zero at each contracting date. Another di¤erence
between both works is that while the former shows the equivalence between short-term
contracts and renegotiation-proof contracts, the latter proves that the agents e¤ort in
equilibrium and the total surplus are independent of the bargaining power. Trying to
encompass these models, Sabac (2006) characterizes the optimal short-term contract
which satises renegotiation-proof including long-term actions, when today actions af-
fect not only today but also tomorrow performance. Unlike all this literature, we
attempt to explain how the fund managers investment maturity decisions are deter-
mined by the design of the optimal labor contracts regarding both short and long-term
actions.
Finally, our paper is also related to some corporate nance literature. In partic-
ular, Von Thadden (1995) constructs a dynamic model with asymmetric information
between risk neutral investors and rms. Under his framework, it makes impossible
to implement long-term projects which are more protable. This work then tries to
explain why some myopic lenders could induce their borrowers - an entrepreneur rm -
to invest in short-term projects. However, unlike our setting, Von Thadden takes only
into account the risk-neutral agents explicit incentives but not his implicit incentives.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a career concern model that
includes investment maturity decisions in the context of an institutional investor, and
characterizes the optimal contract. Section 3 presents a numerical analysis that shows
situations in which fund managers with (without) career concern prefer assets with
short (long) maturity. In the next section, we examine the robustness of these results
when including human capital risk and multitask analysis. Finally, Section 5 concludes
and discusses other possible extensions.
2 The Model
The output performance process
Consider an agency model in which the principal is the mutual funds owner and
the agent corresponds to the trader, who for simplicity we assume that is the mutual
fund manager as well. The trader works for two periods. At the begining of period 1,
the trader selects his investment portfolio. That is, he invests an amount of money I.
At each period t, the output performance of this process corresponds to the variation
of the value of such an investments (i.e.the return) denoted by zt. This is given by
an additive formulation of the traders ability (), the traders non-negative e¤ort (at)
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and a noise (Ht ), as follows
zt  4It =  + at + Ht ; (2.1)
where  is normally distributed with mean m0 and variance 20.
Similarly, we assume that the noise Ht is normally distributed with mean Ht and
variance 2
H
. The index H denotes the horizon of the investment so that H = S
(= L) means that the trader selects short-maturity (long-maturity) securities. Thus,
the agent decides not only the e¤ort level, but also the horizon of his investment.
Following Von Thadden (1995), we assume that the short-maturity investment gives
more benets in the rst-period than the long-maturity one. However, regarding the
total gains for the two periods, long-maturity assets are more protable than short-
maturity ones. Moreover, we suppose that the long-maturity investment is more risky
than the short-term one. These ideas are formalized by means of the next assumptions:
(A1) S1 > L1 ,
(A2) S2 < L2 ,
(A3) S1 + S2 < L1 + L2 , and
(A4) 2
S
< 2
L
,
where  2 (0; 1) represents a discount factor.
In addition, we adopt some standard assumptions in the career concerns literature.
First, independence both among Ht s, and with ability ; is supposed to be hold.
Second, we assume that the true ability of the trader is unknown even for himself.
As a consequence, the principal adjusts her beliefs on the mean and the variance of
this ability based only upon the information revealed through the investment returns
observed in the previous period.
The payo¤ functions
The trader is risk-averse with the following exponential utility function:
U(w1; w2; a1; a2) =   exp( r
(
2X
t=1
t 1 [wt   g(at)]
)
)
where wt is the agents wage, g(:) measures the disutility of e¤ort and r corresponds to
the absolute risk-aversion index. We assume that g(:) is convex and satises g0(0) = 0;
g0(1) =1 and g000  0.
We consider two kind of agents: young traders and old traders, While the former
have career concerns, the latter do not care about their future careers.
The funds owner is risk-neutral with a prot function given by4
(z1; z2;w1; w2) =
2X
t=1
t 1 (zt   wt) :
4We normalize the price of output to unity.
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Type of Employment Contracts
We assume throughout the paper that all employment contracts o¤ered by funds
owners to traders correspond to linear contracts of the form wt(zt) = ct + btzt. On
the one side, ct, the xed part, represents the insurance wage since traders are risk-
averse. On the other side, bt, the variable component, is called the pay-for-performance
sensitivity.
Within this linear formulation, we specify two di¤erent types of labor contracts:
contingent and non-contingent contracts, as follows.
(1) Contingent contract with termination after bad news (CC). This arrangement
consists of two one-period labor contracts, one for each period. However, if the rst-
period results are less than certain threshold z, the whole contract nishes and is not
renewed to the second period.5 In this sense, it is a contingent contract because the
second-period contract is exerted only under the condition z1 > z . According to this
contract, the trader can only select short-maturity assets.
(2) Non-contingent contract with continuation after bad news (NC). This is a two-
period labor contract in which no matter what happens to the rst-period output. In
this sense, it is non-contingent because the continuation of the contract to the second-
period does not depend on the rst-period results. According to this contract, the
trader can only select long-maturity assets.6
Therefore, each labor contract allows the trader to invest in assets with di¤erent
maturity. Thus, the risk-expected return proles associated to contingent and non-
contingent contracts di¤er. One motivation for this assumption comes from the fact
that employment arrangements very similar to these two kind of contracts are observed
in the real world. This is the case of institutional investors which must o¤er di¤erent
labor contracts to its traders because they face customers with di¤erent risk-return
proles and investment horizons. Thus, while some investors looks for high returns in
the short-term (who put their savings in hedge funds, money management companies,
and aggressive mutual funds), others are willing to wait for larger gains in the long-term
(who put their savings in insurance companies, pension fund companies, and private
equity rms).
Timing of the contracting game
We assume that all the bargaining power is on agents hands. The timing of this
game depends on the type of labor contract chosen by the trader (and thereby, on the
horizon investment selected by him).
5For instance, z could be equal zero. Thus, after bad results, the contract is not renegotiated.
6Gibbons and Murphy (1992) demonstrate a renegotiation proof for this kind of contracts. First,
they characterize a two short-term labor contracts. Then, they construct an optimal long-term labor
contract o¤ering a di¤erent explicit incentives in each period.
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In the case of contingent labor contracts, the timing is as follows. At the beginning
of the rst period, prospective employers simultaneously o¤er the trader single-period
linear wage contracts w1(z1) as dened before and he chooses the most attractive one.
The trader selects a short-maturity asset and exerts a level of e¤ort. At the end of
the rst period, the rst-period wage is paid. At the same time, the principal and the
market observe the output z1. At the beginning of period 2, if they observe good
results (z1 > z), they simultaneously o¤er the trader another single-period linear wage
contract w2(z2). After that, the trader exerts a new level of e¤ort. At the end of the
second period, investment returns are known, wages are paid, and the game is over. In
contrast, if bad news on the rst-period result are revealed (z1 < z), no new contract
for the second-period is o¤ered to him by any principal.
In the case of non-contingent labor contracts, the timing is very similar with two
exceptions. First, the trader selects instead a long-maturity asset. Second, the second-
period contract w2(z2) is always o¤ered no matter what happens to the investment
return in the previous period.
Characterization of the Optimal Contract
Given the compensation contracts described above, the traders expected utility is
a function of the rst and second period e¤ort as follows
 E fexp( r [c1 + b1z1   g(a1)]  r [c2(z1) + b2z2   g(a2)])g : (2.2)
In order to solve this problem, consider the Subperfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE)
concept. Consequently, we apply backward induction so that we begin characterizing
the second-period e¤ort problem.
Second-period contract. The characterization of the second-period contract
assumes implicitly that the second-period result is larger than the threshold z in the
case of the contingent contract. From the perspective of the second-period trader, after
the rst-period e¤ort a1 and the horizon investment H have been chosen, and z1 has
been observed, his e¤ort choice problem is given by
max
a2
 E fexp( r [c2 + b2z2   g(a2)])jz1g : (2.3)
Hence, a2(b2), the optimal second-period agents e¤ort choice satises
g0(a2) = b2 (2.4)
Note that we assume that all the bargaining power is on the agents hands. As a
consequence, competition among prospective second-period employers implies that the
contract the trader accepts for the second period must generate zero expected prots.
Therefore, the principals zero prot condition at period 2 is given by
2 = E fz2jz1g   [c2(z1; b2) + b2E fz2jz1g] = 0: (2.5)
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Hence, and according to (2.1), the optimal xed part of the second-period wage can
be obtained using the following condition:
c2(z1; b2) = (1  b2)E fz2jz1g
= (1  b2)
h
E fjz1g+ a2(b2) + H2
i
(2.6)
Using De Groot (1970), it can be stated that the conditional distribution of  given
the observed rst-period output z1 is Normal with mean
E fjz1g  m1(z1;a^1) =
2
H
(m0 + H1
) + 20(z1   a^1)
20 + 
2
H
(2.7)
and variance
V fjz1g  21 =
20
2
H
20 + 
2
H
; (2.8)
where a^1 represents the markets conjecture about the rst-period e¤ort. Let 2
H
z2jz1 
21+ 
2
H
, the conditional variance of + H2 given the observed rst-period output z1.
Applying the rst-order approach, we can substitute (2.4) and (2.6) into (2.3) to
restate the e¤ort choice problem. Accordingly, for an arbitrary b2 and given the rst-
period output z1, (2.3) can be rewritten as:
max
b2
 E fexp( r [c2(z1; b2) + b2z2   g(a2(b2))])jz1g :
Using (2.7) and (2.8), this problem becomes
max
b2
m1(z1; a^1) + a

2(b2) + H2
  g(a2(b2))  1=2r
h
b22
2H
2
i
:
Now, using the rst order conditions of this optimization problem, we get the following
expression for b2:
bC2 =
1h
1 + r2
H
z2jz1g
00(a2)
i ; (2.9)
where C = NC and CC. Note from (2.9) that the second-period explicit incentives
depend on the conditional variance of the second-period output 2
H
z2jz1 : This means that
the pay for performance is sensitive to the type of employment contract, and thereby,
to the horizon investment.
First-period contract. Now, we analyze separately contingent and non-
contingent labor arrangements. We start nding out what is the optimal contract
in the rst case. Given the optimal second-period contract derived above, the traders
incentive problem at the rst-period is to choose a1 to maximize:
 E fexp( r [c1 + b1z1   g(a1)]  r [c2(z1; b2) + b2z2   g(a2(b2))])g : (2.10)
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From the rst-order condition of this problem, we obtain
g0(a1) = b1 + 
@c2(z1; b

2)
@a1
 B1: (2.11)
So far, we have taken a^1 as given. Thus, the last expression characterizes implicitely the
traders best response to the markets second-period conjecture about the rst-period
e¤ort, a^1. Since equation (2.11) does not depend on a^1, in equilibrium the markets
conjecture coincides with the optimal rst period e¤ort. Therefore, the equilibrium
conjecture is
a^1 = a

1(b1):
As was established before, the principals expected prot must be zero in each period.
Hence, we have that
c1(b1) = (1  b1)E fz1g
= (1  b1)(m0 + a1(b1) + H1 ) (2.12)
Notice that the terms inside the two exponential functions of expression (2.10) cor-
respond to variables normally distributed. Thus, we can apply the property of the
log-normal random variables.7 Then, substituting a1(b1) and c1(b1) into (2.10) yields
the rst-period traders expected utility for an arbitrary b1:
  exp ( r z1   g(a1(b1)) r z2   g(a2(b2)) 12r2 h(B1 + b2)22Hz1   2B1b22Hi )
with z1 = E(z1); z2 = E(z2) and 
2H
z1 = V (z1). The rst-order condition of this
problem with respect to b1 gives us the following expression:
bC1 =
1
1 + r
P2H
z1
g00(a1(b1))| {z }
Noise reduction e¤ ect
  (1  b2)
20
20 + 
2H
| {z }
Career concern e¤ ect
  rb

2
2
0g
00(a1(b1))
1 + r
P2H
z1
g00(a1(b1))| {z }
Career risk e¤ ect
(2.13)
where C = NC;CC.
We observe three class of e¤ects on the pay-for-performance component: (i) a noise
reduction e¤ect, (ii) a career concerns e¤ect, and (iii) a career risk e¤ect. The noise re-
duction e¤ect means that the higher the conditional variance of output, the smaller the
variable compensation. In other words, the trader prefers less noise in the investment
process. The career concerns e¤ect reects the substitutability between explicit and
implicit incentives. Thus, the higher the career concern-based incentives measured by
the second term of the r.h.s. of equation (2.13), the smaller the pay-for performance.
7These terms are essentially linear combinations of z1; and z2, which are normally distributed.
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Lastly, the career risk e¤ect formalizes the idea that a risk-averse trader wants to be
compensated for high variances in his performance due to low realizations of ability.
It is worthy to note how di¤erences in labor contracts, and so di¤erences in
investment horizons, a¤ect this substitutability between explicit and implicit incen-
tives. Therefore, we observe di¤erent linear wages depending on contingency or non-
contingency of employment contracts, and thereby, on the maturity (long vs. short) of
the assets.8
The relevance of the risk aversion assumption can be stated from the following
simple analysis. It is easy to verify from (2.13) that under risk neutrality (r = 0), the
rst-period explicit incentives of both contingent and non-contingent labor contracts
becomes
b
C
1 = 1 
"


1  bC2
 20
20 + 
2
H
!#
:
Since now from (2.9) bC2 = 1, it follows that b
C
1 = 1 for C = CC;NC. Therefore,
this illustrates that in order to explain how the presence of these two class of contracts
a¤ects the trader´s investment horizon decision, one must assume risk aversion.
Old Traders Optimal Contracts
As was mentioned before, while the young agents cares about their future career,
the old ones has no such reputational concerns. We formalize this di¤erence in our
setup by assuming that ability of the old trader has already been fully revealed, and
thus, its variance 20 is equal to zero. As a result, it yields the following optimal explicit
incentives for old traders at the second-period
bC2 =
1h
1 + r2
H
g00(a2)
i ;
and at the rst-period
bC1 =
1
1 + r2
H
g00(a1(b1))
for C = CC;NC: The last expression shows clearly that optimal contracts for old
traders only exhibit a noise reduction e¤ect, but neither career concern nor risk career
e¤ect come to play a role. The absence of reputational concerns then implies that all
incentives are driven by the pay for performance component, and no substitutability
between explicit and implicit incentives emerges.
8 In the next section we endogeneize the career-risk concern (or human capital risk concerns), which
also a¤ects this substitutability.
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3 Investment Maturity Decision: Numerical Results
The main purpose of this paper is to characterize conditions under which traders
(young and old) prefer to invest in either long or short maturity assets. To this end,
we perform a comparison in terms of the surplus obtained by these agents from the two
class of labor contracts analized in our setting: non-contingent (NC) and contingent
(CC) contracts.
Let SCY and S
C
O be the surplus obtained from the labor contract C by young and old
traders, respectively. Also, let us dene surplus di¤erencesDY andDO asDY = SCCY  
SNCY andDO = S
CC
O   SNCO , respectively. A positive surplus di¤erence evaluated at the
optimal contract then indicates that a trader (young or old) prefers to sign a contingent
employment contract instead of a non-contingent one. Equivalently, this means that
he also prefers to invest in a short-maturity assets instead of a long-maturity ones.
In order to assess the traders surplus from both labor contracts, one need to choose
realistic numerical values for all model parameters. Ravin (2000) developed a set
of parameter values that approximates decisions that resemble real-world investment
choices by assuming a CARA utility function. The specic parameter values employed
are the following.
First, we assume the following preference parameters: a risk aversion parameter
r = :05 and a discount factor  = :9. Second, our analysis has shown that optimal
contracts (and so traders surplus di¤erences) depend crucially on both expected return
and riskiness of investments - for both long and short maturity ones -. Based upon
U.S. historical data, we suppose that the long-maturity asset is normally distributed
with mean return 6.4% and standard deviation 10%.9 In contrast, we assume that the
short-maturity asset follows a normal distribution with mean return 0.5% and standard
deviation of 0.3%.
Given these parameters, we construct the variance ratio KV as follows
KV =
2
L
2
S
;
and KM , the following mean return ratio
KM =
L1
+ L2
S1
+ S2
:
Since the bargaining power is on agents hands, the trader surplus is the expected
CARA utility function evaluated at the optimal contract characterized in the previous
section. Table 1 shows the e¤ects of both the variance ratio and the mean return ratio
on surplus di¤erences of old and young traders.
9Ravin (2000) works with a standard deviation of 20%. Our assumption is thus more conservative.
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case KM = 12 KM = 13 KM = 14
KV = 20 DY = 0.00135 DY = 0.00110 DY = 0.00085
DO = -0.00007 DO = -0.00031 DO = -0.00055
KV = 40 DY = 0.00189 DY = 0.00165 DY = 0.00140
DO = -0.00090 DO = -0.00112 DO = -0.00136
KV = 60 DY = 0.00234 DY = 0.00209 DY = 0.00184
DO = -0.00169 DO = -0.00233 DO = -0.00216
KM = ratio between long-maturity and short-maturity expected return.
KV = ratio between long-maturity and short-maturity variance.
DY=Young manager's surplus difference.
DO=Old manager's surplus difference.
TABLE 1
Surplus difference between non-contingent and contingent labor contract
We observe that under a variance ratio su¢ ciently high (KV  20), young traders
prefer a contingent labor contract instead of a non-contingent one. This result follows
from the substitutability between explicit and implicit incentives in our model. Then,
the higher the career concerns they face, the smaller the non-contingent labor contract
explicit incentives. This implies that they are more conservative in their investments,
and thereby, choose short-maturity assets.
Moreover, the higher the long-maturity asset variance, the higher the preference
by young traders for contingent labor contracts, and so, for short-maturity assets.
Since managers concern about his future job opportunities, they care about career-risk
concerns. This last e¤ect implies less non-contingent explicit incentives again. Thus,
the higher the preference to invest in less risky assets.
On the contrary, since old traders do not have career concerns, they only care about
explicit incentives. Thus, there is no substitutability between explicit and implicit
incentives. As a result, they hold riskier assets. Furthermore, the higher the long-
maturity asset variance - the higher KV -, the higher the preference for non-contingent
labor contracts, and thus, for long-maturity assets.
It is important to note that these numerical results account for one of the main
stylized facts described by Chevalier and Ellison (1999) for the U.S. mutual fund mar-
ket. In fact, they present evidence that suggests that old managers prefer assets with
longer maturity than those assets selected by the young ones. Interestingly, Chevalier
and Ellison also attributes these di¤erences in investment maturity to reputational
concerns.
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4 Extensions
4.1 Including Human Capital Risk
In the previous section we take into account reputation concerns, i.e. how the managers
current performance a¤ects the level of his future compensation. However, the agents
current performance can also a¤ect the variability of his prospective compensation,
what we call career-risk concerns or human capital risk.10 To study this e¤ect, in
this section we introduce two innovations to the baseline model: (i) di¤erent degrees
of career concern, and (ii) an additional class of e¤ort called information e¤ort.
The main implication of this extension is that we can observe complementarity be-
tween implicit and explicit incentives instead of substitutability as we have seen before.
Following Chen and Jiang (2008), we introduce a multitask analysis and generalize the
last career concern setup. A numerical analysis points out that now both old and young
fund managers prefer to invest assets with long maturity.
4.1.1 Degree of Career Concerns
In order to implement this extension, we introduce a correlation in the ability process.
Now, the ability or productivity measure follows a normal stationary autoregressive
process with one lag, i.e., AR(1). In this way, t is correlated over time through the
next system:
1 = 
2 =  +
p
1  2:
As in previous section, we assume both the principal and the agent share the com-
mon prior that  is normal distributed with variance . For simplicity, we assume
throughout this section that E () = m0 = 0. Further,  is a zero mean gaussian nor-
mal process independent of , with variance equal to . Therefore, 1 and 2 have
the same unconditional variance equal to 2.
Notice that  plays an important role in this process because when  = 1, we
are in the baseline model in which career concerns are maximum. In addition, 
captures the degree of persistence of the agents career concerns since a higher  implies
higher sensitivity of the agents future compensation to current-period performance.
Furthermore, when we model the second period as a reduced-form representation of
all future periods, the career concerns parameter, , captures the tenure e¤ect. The
smaller the expected tenure implies the lower correlation between the agents ability
10See Mukherjee (2005) and Chen and Jiang (2004).
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and the rms future productivity. Then, by introducing  2 [0; 1] we analyze the
relationship between explicit incentives and the degree of the agents career concerns.
4.1.2 Multitask and Career-Risk Concerns
Following Chen and Jiang (2004), we introduce a new class of e¤ort: information
collection e¤ort, e 2 [0; 1]. In this way, the trader can exert another type of e¤ort
in order to produce a publicly veriable report, r, about his ability . There exists
some linear relationship between the report and the ability: r = 1 + , where  is
a zero mean normal innovation term orthogonal to 1 with variance
(1 e)
e . This
variance implies that the higher information collection e¤ort, the higher the precision
of the report to forecast 1. We assume that the principal only uses the report r for
contracting goals.
As in our baseline model, we assume that the contract takes the linear form wt =
ct+btzt+tr where ct; bt and t are constants. Notice that we introduce r as a variable
that can help the principal to forecast the next period ability. In this way, the wage
system can be rewritten as:
w1 = c1 + b1z1 + 1r
w2 = c2(r; z1) + b2z2
We assume that e is not contractible, i.e. it is chosen by the agent after the contract is
o¤ered to him and is non-veriable. The timeline of this game is described by Figure
1.
t=0 0<t<1 t=1 1<t<2 t=2
Principal offers a wage
payment contingent on
z1 and r.
Agent chooses both
a1 and e.
First-period contract is
executed and z1 and r are
observed.  Second-period
contract is signed.
Agent chooses a2.
Second-period contract is
executed and z2 is
observed.
In order to solve the model, we consider again the Subperfect-Nash equilibrium concept.
Then, using backward induction, at the beginning of the second-period, z1 and r are
observed. Afterwards, the trader chooses a1 and e. Finally, the principal chooses c2
and b2 to maximize the expected prot subject to the agents participation and the
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incentive compatibility constraint. Then, the second period e¤ort choice problem is:
max
a2
 E fexp r (w2   g(a2)) jr; z1g :
Thus, a2(b2) satises g0(a2) = b2. As in the previous section, normalizing the price of
output to unity and using zero prot condition, we obtain:
c2(z1; r; b2) = (1  b2)E fz2 j z1; rg
= (1  b2)
h
E f j z1; rg+ a2(b2) + H2
i
; (4.1)
with
E(jz1; r)  m1(z1; r; a^1)
=
(1  e)20(z1   a1) + e2Hr + (1  e)2HH1
(1  e)20 + 2H
(4.2)
and variance
V (jz1; r)  21
=
(1  e)202H
(1  e)20 + 2H
: (4.3)
In this way, we observe how the reputation concerns, , and career-risk concerns, e,
a¤ect the agents xed wage in the second period. Now, replacing c2(z1; b2) and a2(b2)
in the agents maximization problem, we obtain
b2 =
1h
1 + r2
H
2 g
00(a2)
i ; (4.4)
with 2
H
2 = 
2
1 + 
2
H
. We observe a positive implicit relationship between informa-
tion collection e¤ort and second-period explicit incentives through total conditional
variance.
Given the optimal second-period contract derived above, the traders rst-period
incentive problem is to choose a1 to maximize the following problem:
 E fexp( r [c1 + b1z1 + 1r   g(a1)]  r [c2(z1; b2) + b2z2   g(a2(b2))])g :
Then, we get
g0(a1) = b1 + 
@c2(z1; b2)
@a1
= b1 + 
(
(1  b2)
"
(1  e)20
(1  e)20 + 2H
#)
 B1: (4.5)
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So far we have taken a^1 as given. Thus, the last expression characterizes the workers
best response to the markets second-period conjecture about rst-period e¤ort, a^1.
Since equation (4.5) does not depend on a^1, in equilibrium, the markets conjecture
coincides with the optimal rst period e¤ort.
Therefore, the equilibrium conjecture is:
a^1 = a

1(b1):
As we established before, the fund owners expected prots must be zero in each period.
Hence, assuming a0 = 0,
c1(b1) = (1  b1)E fz1g
= (1  b1)

m0 + a

1(b1) + 
H
1

+ 1E(r): (4.6)
Since E(r) = 0, we then obtain the same expression as our baseline model.
Substituting a1(b1) and c1(b1) in the rst-period maximization problem yields the
following rst-period expected utility for an arbitrary b1:
  exp (  r m0 + a1(b1) + H1   g(a1(b1))  r m0 + a2(b2) + a1 + H2 )  g(a2(b2))
  (1=2)r2
"
(B1 + b

2)
22
H
1   2B1b22H + (+ b2)220 + 2

(1  e)
e
2
2
H
  2b2220
#
)
with 2
H
1 = 
2
0 + 
2
H
.
From the rst order condition with respect to b1 we get
b
C
1 =
1
1 + r2
H
1 g
00(a1(b1))
 

1  bC2
 (1  e)20
(1  e)20 + 2H
  rb
C
2 
2
0g
00(a1(b1))
1 + r2
H
1 g
00(a1(b1))
(4.7)
with C = CC, NC.
4.2 Numerical Analysis
To assess the traders surplus from contingent and non-contingent labor contracts, we
need to choose realistic numerical values for all model parameters. We assume  and
 equals to 0.5.11 In order to observe a degree of substitutability between explicit
and implicit incentives, we assume an information e¤ort level e = :1. The rest of
parameters are the same as in our baseline model. The following table presents the
surplus di¤erence between both class of contracts for traders with and wihout career
concerns:
11When we only consider di¤erent levels of career concerns, we obtain the same results as in our
baseline model. This means that our previous analysis is robust to intertemporal correlations in the
ability process. Only when we include Chen and Jiangs modications about di¤erent kind of e¤ort -
multitask analysis - we observe changes in our baseline model results.
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case KM = 12 KM = 13 KM = 14
KV = 20 DY = -0,11061 DY = -0,11083 DY = -0,11106
DO = -0,00801 DO = -0,00825 DO = -0,00849
KV = 40 DY = -0,11949 DY = -0,11972 DY = -0,11994
DO = -0,01624 DO = -0,01647 DO = -0,01671
KV = 60 DY = -0,12822 DY = -0,12844 DY = -0,12866
DO = -0,02439 DO = -0,02463 DO = -0,02486
KM = ratio between long-maturity and short-maturity expected return.
KV = ratio between long-maturity and short-maturity variance.
DY=Young manager's surplus difference.
DO=Old manager's surplus difference.
TABLE 2
Surplus difference between non-contingent and contingent labor contract
With degrees of career-concern and multitask analysis, we observe that both young
and old managers prefer to invest in long-maturity assets, as DO;DY < 0. More-
over, both types of traders behave in the same way when the variance ratio increases.
Thus, the higher the variance of long-maturity assets, the higher the preference to
non-contingent labor contracts. The intuition of this result is that the higher the
career-risk concerns, the smaller the information e¤ort level. As a consequence, the
mutual funds owner may nd optimal to increase the pay-for-performance sensitivity.
All of this implies that young managers become bolder as they also follow investment
strategies with long maturity.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper addresses an important puzzle in nancial economics: why fund managers
invest in short-maturity assets even though they could obtain more prots by holding
positions in securities with longer maturity. We provide an explanation to this phe-
nomenon based on the labor contracts signed between institutional investors and their
traders.
In particular, we examine how di¤erences in the pay-for-performances sensitivity
of young and old traders a¤ect their investment horizon decisions when career concerns
are considered. In our framework, only young traders care about their career concerns.
By analyzing the substitutability between explicit and implicit incentives contained
in the optimal labor contracts, we then perform a numerical analysis showing that
young (old) managers prefer short-maturity (long-maturity) positions. The higher
the career concerns they face, the smaller the non-contingent labor contract explicit
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incentives. This implies they are not bold in their investments, and thus, they choose
short-maturity assets.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Since the history of old traders
performance have already been revealed, the principals prediction about their ability
is better than that made on the young ones. As a consequence, young traders prefer
contingent labor contracts that implicitly lead them to select assets with a higher
mean return in the short run. This allows young traders to improve the principals
belief about his ability, and thus, increase both the chances of being retained and
his second-period compensation. However, as short-maturity assets exhibit lower mean
return than long-maturity ones in the long run, we eventually have a situation in which
less protable assets are selected. Interestingly, this prediction is consistent with the
recent evidence found by empirical literature focused on the U.S. mutual fund market
(Chevalier and Ellison, 1999).
Furthermore, we extend our model by performing a sensibility analysis of the results
when we include both career-risk concerns - how the agents current performance
a¤ects the variability of his future compensation - and multitask analysis. A numerical
analysis suggests that traders with and without career concerns prefer a non-contingent
labor contract. The intuition of this result is that the higher the career-risk concerns,
the smaller the information e¤ort level. Then, the mutual funds owner may nd
optimal to increase the managers pay-for-performance sensitivity. As a result, young
managers become eventually bolder in their investment strategies.
Some extensions of this work may take into account other aspects of the optimal
contracts: switching costs when traders decide to change the job; other kind of remu-
nerations in order to know more about the traders ability, for instante, stock options;
and so on. Furthermore, it should be considered other classes of performance process
which also imply di¤erences in the pay-for-performance sensitivity between young and
old managers. For instance, the variation of investments could follow a long memory
process instead of a normal stationary AR(1) process, which is more closed to the
empirical works in GDP time series.12
12Mayoral (2004) presents evidence that GNP per capita follows a long-memory process.
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1 Introduction
One of the most remarkable puzzle in nancial economics is the so-called trade puz-
zle. This puzzle concerns the inability of standard nance paradigm to account for
(high) trade observed in nancial markets under an environment with asymmetric in-
formation. Given the increasing presence of institutional ownership in nancial markets
during the last fty years, new explanations to this phenomenon have strongly hinged
on the features of this class of investors.1
In particular, recent literature on nancial economics has recognized the prominent
role played by contracts signed by investors and fund companies. Among these works,
that of Dasgupta and Prat (2006, [1]) provides an especially interesting framework that
explains the puzzle trade based mainly upon two elements. First, they consider the
agency problems that emerge when the investor delegates his portfolio management
to the fund company. In addition, due to the no observation of the fund managers
ability, they study contracts with implicit incentives given by reputational or career
concerns. This setting predicts that the presence of career concerns induces uniformed
fund managers to churn, i.e. to trade even when they face a negative expected return.2
Noise trade given by churning makes prices to be non-fully informative, which yields
a positive trading volume in the asset market.
Dasgupta and Prat treat fund companies and fund managers as the same entity,
abstracting then from any agency problem between them. However, as Chevalier and
Ellison (1999, [2]) document, the lack of aligned incentives resulting from this delega-
tion process may become very important to the portfolio strategies followed by fund
managers. Accordingly, in this paper we extend the set-up of Dasgupta and Prat and
study the e¤ects that the additional delegation from fund companies to fund man-
agers can generate on the nancial markets equilibrium. Our main result points out
that when the reputational costs of both fund companies and fund managers are also
considered, the career concern-based explanation for the trade puzzle becomes strong.
As a consequence, this paper accounts not only for the increasing trading activity ob-
served in the nancial markets during the last decades, but also for the relation of
this phenomenon to the increasing participation of institutional investors with more
portfolio management delegation inside them (Dow and Gorton 1997, [3]; Cuoko and
Kanel 2001, [4]; Chevalier and Ellison 1997, [5], and 1999, [2]).
1For instance, in the New York Stock Exchange, the percentage of outstanding corporate equity
held by institutional investors has increased from 7,2% in 1950 to 49,8% in 2002 (NYSE Factbook
2003).
2Churning can be dened as to make the account of a client excessively active by frequent purchases
and sales primarily in order to generate commissions.
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This structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a model with two-
sided career concerns contracts between fund companies and fund managers. The next
section characterizes the churning equilibrium, and discusses its implications for the
trade puzzle. Finally, Section 4 concludes. All the proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Consider a two-period economy. The market trades an Arrow security, which has liqui-
dation value v = 0 or 1 with the same probability of occurrence. This value is revealed
at time t and independent across periods. There are a large pool of ex-ante identical
fund companies and fund managers3. All of them are risk-neutral.
In the rst period, one of the fund companies is employed at random by the investor,
a single risk-neutral principal. Likewise, this fund company may hire one fund managers
and, if so, at the end of the rst period she may decide to retain him, hire a challenger
of average quality from the pool, or not to hire. Her decision is based on the net return
obtained by the fund manager. In the same way, in period 2, the investor decides to
renew the incumbent fund company or hire a new one as she can attempt to infer the
ability of the fund company from the outcome of trading.
Therefore, in this environment, we observe two kind of principal-agent contracts:
the rst one between the investor and the fund company, and the second one between
the fund company and the fund manager. In addition, both agency relationships are
characterized by reputational or career concerns. This is because present actions taken
by both fund companies and fund managers a¤ect their chances of being retained, and
thereby, their future compensations.
The fund company can be of two types: talented or untalented. This is represented
by  2 fu; tg ; with Pr( = t) = . Similarly, the fund manager can be of two types:
good or bad, represented by  2 fb; gg so that Pr( = g) = . Ex ante, all types are
unknown to fund companies, fund managers and the investor, and are independent of
v.
Fund managers interact with a large number of risk-neutral short-lived competitive
uninformed market makers (hereafter traders). Half of them operate in t = 1, the
other half operate in t = 2. Fund managers can issue market orders (at) to buy one
unit of the asset (at = 1), to sell one unit (at = 0) or not to trade (at = ;). The traders
sets ask (pat ) and bid (p
b
t) prices equal to the expected value of v conditional on the
observed order history. The bid-ask spread pat   pbt may be positive, with pat 2

1
2 ; 1

3Throughout the paper, we refer to the principal as she and the agent as he. Notice that the fund
company is the agent in the relationship with the investor and the principal in the labor contract with
the manager.
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and pbt 2

0; 12

. Since fund managers are free to choose one of the market markers at
random, they are then subject to Bertrand competition. Moreover, for simplicity we
assume that traders do not know whether they are in period 1 or 2.4
Before contracting, fund companies observe a signal  on managers type. Talented
companies observe an informative signal that reveals the true type of the manager. In
contrast, untalented companies have access to a noisy signal that does not improve
their beliefs on the managers type. Formally, we have that
(; ) =
(
 if  = t
; if  = u
Based upon this information, fund companies make a decision et 2 f0; 1g, where et = 1
(et = 0) corresponds to hiring (not to hiring) the manager. Whereas untalented fund
companies choose good (bad) fund managers with probability  (with probability 1 ),
talented fund companies only choose good fund managers.
The information structure of the fund manager is as follows. At time t a fund
manager receives a signal s which can take three values, 0, 1, or ;. This signal reveals
privately him his true type as it is determined as follows
s(v; ) =
(
v if  = g
; if  = b
In order to make a di¤erence between trading and not trading, there exists a cost of
trading  > 0 paid by the fund manager.
The net return on investment obtained by the fund manager at time t is denoted
by t; and is dened by
t(a; p
a
t ; p
b
t ; v; ) =
8>><>>:
v   pat    if a = 1
pbt   v    if a = 0
0 if a = ;
Untalented fund companies form a posterior belief about the fund managers type
based upon net returns yield by the portfolio, which is observed at the end of period 1.
Similarly, the investor updates her belief about the fund companys type based on the
same information. All of this is formalized by the posterior probabilities Pr( = gjt)
and Pr( = tjt).
All contractual arrangements between the investor, fund companies and fund man-
agers are exogenously set out. Furthermore, we model payo¤s to fund companies and
fund managers using a simple linear compensation structure. Accordingly, given the net
4This means that they are unable to condition thier action of their seniority (see Dasgupta and
Prat 2006, [1], p. 11).
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return t, fees charged by the fund company to the investor correspond to wt = t+:
Similarly, the payment from the fund company to the manager is given by t = t+.
We assume that  and  2 (0; 1); and  and  2 (0;1).5
Hence, the total investors payo¤ is given by6
2X
t=1
(t   wt)
and the total fund companys payo¤ is
2X
t=1
(wt   t):
To summarize, the timing is as follows:
t = 1
- The investor hires a fund company at random.
- The fund company learns 1 and chooses a hiring action e1.
- The fund manager learns s1 and chooses a trading action a1.
- Traders observe a1 and set prices.
- The investor and the fund company observe the net return yield by the portfolio.
All other traders observe v. Payments to the fund company and the fund manager are
made.
t = 2
- The investor retains the incumbent fund company or hires a new one.
- The fund company retains the incumbent fund manager or, hires the challenger
(chooses a hiring action e2).7
- The fund manager oberves s2 and chooses a trading action a2.
- Traders observe a2 and set prices.
- The investor and the fund company observe the net return yield by the portfolio.
All other traders observe v. Payments to the fund company and the fund manager are
made.
3 The Results
3.1 The Churning Equilibrium
In this subsection we characterize a churning equilibrium in which both fund companies
and fund managers always trade in the rst period. This class of equilibrium is crucial
5Since both wt and t depend on t, the compensation scheme considers the possibility of a penalty
whenever t < 0.
6We assume a zero discounting rate.
7We will see that in equilibrium this may occur only for untalented fund companies, as talented
ones always hire good managers in the rst period.
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to get both non-fully informative prices and a high trading volume.
Proposition 3.1. For , , and  low enough, there exists an equilibrium in which:
(i) The investor retains the fund company if the portfolios return is satisfactory (pos-
itive) and replaces him otherwise.
(ii) A talented fund company always both hires good managers and retains them. An
untalented fund company hires at random managers, and retains the incumbent man-
ager if and only if the portfolios return is satisfactory (positive).
(iii) A good fund manager always trades. A bad fund manager churns if t = 1, and he
does not trade if t = 2.
(iv) Traders set prices
p^at =
1
2
(1 + ^) and p^bt =
1
2
(1  ^)
where
^ =
2 + (1  )(2 + 12(1  ))
1 +  + (1  )(1 + 12(1  ))
:
Proof. See the Appendix 
Proposition 3.1 characterizes a churning equilibrium in which all managers trade in
the rst period. While the good manager trades according to his private information
on the asset value, the bad one randomizes between buying and selling.
The investor knows that a successful trade in the rst period (1 > 0) may stem
from a talented fund company (which only hires good managers) or an untalented
one. In the second case, this positive return may result from a good manager (with
probability ) or from a churning bad manager with good luck (with probability (1 
)=2). All of this suggests her that it is more likely that a successful trade comes from
a talented fund company. Consequently, she makes an upward adjustment of her belief
on a talented company when she observes 1 > 0 so that the posterior becomes higher
than the prior, i.e.,
Pr( = tj1 > 0)  :
Equivalently, the investor knows that an unsuccessful trade in the rst period (1 <
0) can only be attributed to an untalented company. In addition, we assume that
she believes that no-trade (an event out of the equilibrium path) can also only be
associated to a untalented fund company. Based upon this structure of beliefs, the
investor retains the rst-period fund company if she observes a positive return, and
replaces it otherwise.
Since a talented fund company knows perfectly the type of the manager, she only
hires good ones. As a consequence, she always observes positive returns and retains
the manager. In contrast, an untalented fund company cannot perfectly associate a
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positive return to a good manager. However, she knows that it is more likely that a
successful trade comes from a good manager than a bad one. Accordingly, she also
makes an upward adjustment on her posterior when positive returns are observed so
that
Pr( = gj1 > 0)  :
Given this structure of beliefs, an untalented fund company retains a manager only if
a successful trade is observed at the rst period.
A good manager always obtains positive returns whenever transaction costs are
low enough ( < b). Since he knows the true liquidation value of the asset, he always
trades correctly and sells or buys according to prices that lie between 0 and 1. Given
the structure of beliefs of the game, he knows that his continuation is ensured.
At rst period, a bad manager has two alternatives: no-trade or churn. On the one
hand, if he does not trade, he makes a zero return and thereby, he is revealed as a
bad manager. As a result, he is replaced for sure. On the other hand, although a bad
manager yields a negative expected return (b  1=2  ) when churning, his chance of
being retained is 50%. Given a linear compensation structure, a su¢ cient condition for
the bad manager to prefer churning is the fact that the pay-for-performance sensitivity
(the parameter ) be lower than the xed payment (the parameter ). This occurs
because in that case the benets from being retained (the second-period xed payment)
overcome the costs of churning (a rst-period penalty coming from a negative expected
return).
Traders cannot distinguish if a market order comes from a good manager or a bad
manager who churns at the rst-period. The price is then based on the probability
that the order is made by a good manager conditional on observing such an order. This
probability corresponds to
^ = Pr ( = gja 2 f0; 1g)
=
2 + (1  )(2 + 12(1  ))
1 +  + (1  )(1 + 12(1  ))
:
It can be veried that the posterior is larger than the prior, i.e., ^ > . The source of
this fact is two-fold. First, as discussed above, while good managers are always retained,
bad ones may be replaced. Second, even if a bad manager is not replaced, he does not
trade in the second period.
Interestingly, the posterior in our model is greater than the posterior resulting from
Dasgupta and Prat (2006, [1]) as
^ > 
5  
2 + 3   2 = ^D&P ;
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where ^D&P denotes the posterior in Dasgupta and Prat. This is due to the fact that
our framework nests the environment studied by these authors as we also incorporate
the possibility of talented fund companies that only hire good managers.
As a result, in our model, traders set equilibrium prices that yield a greater bid-
ask spread than that characterized by Dasgupta and Prat. To see that, note that the
bid-ask price is given by
p^at   p^bt = ^:
From this, it is clear that the bid-ask spread inherits all the properties of posterior
probability, and thus, the result follows. Thus, our bid-ask price is larger than the
Dasgupta and Prats one for all  2 [0; 1) and  > 0. Otherwise, they are equal. This
property is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows that, as long as  > 0 (i.e., there exists
talented fund companies), our model delivers a a higher bid-ask spread.8 This fact
leads us to obtain results that are stronger than those of previous literature in terms
of average trading (see Corollary 1 below).
10.750.50.250
1
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
gamma
bid-ask spread
Figure 1. Bid-ask spread of Portilla (2008) with  = :5 (dotted line), and Dasgupta
and Prat (2006) (solid line).
In addition, note that since the posterior probability of facing a good manager is
increasing with the proportion of talented fund companies, the bid-ask spread does so
(see Figure 2).
8Figure 1 is constructed assuming that  = :5:
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bid-ask spread
Figure 2. Bid-ask spread and proportion of talented fund companies assuming
 = :5.
3.2 Comparative Statics of Trading Volume
The main implication of Proposition 3.1 is the contribution to explaining the trade
puzzle. Trading volume correspond to the expected number of assets traded as average
in the two-period horizon. Thus, it is the average of the probability that a trade takes
place at t = 1 and the probability that a trade takes place at t = 2: From Proposition
3.1, we compute in the next corollary the trading volume in the churning equilibrium.
Corollary 3.2. The average trading volume in the churning equilibrium is
w =
2 + 3   2
4
+
(1  (1 + 1 2 ))
2
:
Proof. See the Appendix 
Some properties of the average trading volume are the following. First, it is positive
even when the proportion of good managers tends to zero. This results from the pres-
ence of a churning equilibrium, which guarantees that the equilibrium in the nancial
market is not fully informative. Second, the average trading volume is increasing with
the prior of both good managers () and talented fund companies (). This is consis-
tent with the previous results related to the bid-ask spread. Third, our model delivers
a trade volume that is higher than the Dasgupta and Prats one for all  2 [0; 1) and
 > 0, and equal otherwise. This is true as it can veried that
w = wD&P +
(1  (1 + 1 2 ))
2
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where
wD&P =
2 + 3   2
4
is the average trading in Dasgupta and Prat (2006, [1]). This fact is also illustrated by
Figure 3.
10.750.50.250
1
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
gamma
w
Figure 3. Average trading volume of Portilla (2008) with  = :5 (dotted line), and
Dasgupta and Prat (2006) (solid line).
Thus, our model allows to account not only for the positive, but also for the large
trading activity observed in nancial markets working under asymmetric information.
The intuition of this result is as follows. The inclusion of an extra delegation stage
in the nancial contracting process provides us with an additional source of reputa-
tional concerns. As a consequence, the two-sided career concerns setup - in particular
the presence of talented fund companies- ends up being crucial to strength previous
reputational-based explanations of the trading puzzle.
4 Conclusions
This paper examines the equilibrium of a nancial market in which there are two stages
of portfolio management delegation: one from investors to fund companies, and the
other one from fund companies to fund managers. In both agency relationships, agents
are reputational concerned. That is, they face a positive probability of being red if
their rst-period performance (measured in terms of the managed portfolio return)
is not satisfactory for the principal. These implicit incentives lead to an uninformed
manager to churn if his compensation scheme ensures him a xed salary su¢ ciently
high. Similarly, these career concern incentives lead to an uninformed fund company to
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hire a manager even knowing that it is likely that he may be uninformed, and thus, he
may generate a penalty against her. However, since the presence of churning managers
increases the chance of getting a positive return, the chance of being retained by the
investor for a fund company does so. As a result, if her compensation structure is so
that the xed component is su¢ ciently large, an uninformed fund company will decide
to (randomly) hire a manager.
This double-sided career concern setup allows a churning equilibrium to emerge in
which prices are not fully informative and the trading volume is positive and high. This
is then the main contribution of our model: it strengths previous explanations to the
trade puzzle based on reputational concerns.
Finally, it is worthy to stress that our model provides results consistent with two
stylized facts observed in nancial markets during the last decades. First, an increas-
ing participation of institutional investors has been accompanied by increasing trade
volumes (Dow and Gorton 1997, [3]). Second, an increase of delegated portfolio man-
agement has lead to a higher trading activity (Cuoko and Kanel 2001, [4], Chevalier
and Ellison 1997, [5], and 1999, [2]).
5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1. In order to obtain this equilibrium, we use the notion of
Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) and we then apply backward induction.
Managers strategy (at t = 2). At t = 2, a bad manager never sells since p^b2 < 1=2
guarantees that p^b2 1=2   < 0: Likewise, it can be veried that a bad manager never
buys as well because p^a2 > 1=2 ensures that 1=2  p^a2    < 0.
A good manager trades as long as transaction costs are low enough. He is strictly better
o¤ buying if 1  p^a2    > 0, which is veried if  < 12(1  ^)  b, and strictly better o¤
selling if p^b2    > 0, which is also satised if the same condition for transaction costs
holds true.
Untalented fund companys belief. Possible rst-period realizations of the net return
are the following ones:
(i) Successful purchase or sale: 1 = b   > 0 provided that  < b.
(ii) Wrong purchase or sale: 1 = b  1   < 0 because b < 1.
(iii) No trade: 1 = 0.
Since only (i) and (ii) are observed in equilibrium, we can assume any conjecture for
the result out of the equilibrium path. In particular, we assume a null probability. An
untalented fund company then requires that their beliefs be consistent with equilibrium
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play which implies that
Pr( = gj1) =
8>><>>:
0 if 1 < 0
+(1 )
+ 1
2
(1+)(1 ) if 1 > 0
0 if 1 = 0
which follows from
Pr( = gj1 > 0) =
Pr( = g; 1 > 0)
Pr(1 > 0)
=
 + (1  )
 + 12(1 + )(1  )
since
Pr( = g; 1 > 0) = Pr( = g; 1 > 0j = t) Pr( = t) +
Pr( = g; 1 > 0j = u) Pr( = u)
=  + (1  )
and
Pr(1 > 0) = Pr(1 > 0j = t) Pr( = t) + Pr(1 > 0j = u) Pr( = u)
=  +
1
2
(1 + )(1  )
because
Pr(1 > 0j = t) = Pr(1 > 0j = t;  = g) Pr( = g)
+Pr(1 > 0j = t;  = b) Pr( = b)
= 
and
Pr(1 > 0j = u) = Pr(1 > 0j = u;  = g) Pr( = g)
+Pr(1 > 0j = u;  = b) Pr( = b)
=  +
1
2
(1  ):
Moreover, it is possible to show that Pr( = b; 1 > 0) = 0:
9 The untalented fund
companys best response is to retain if and only if the posterior is higher than the prior
probability, i.e. if
Pr( = gj1)  :
9Since a good (bad) manager generates a positive (negative) expected portfolio return.
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This is only satised by Pr( = gj1 > 0) since
 + (1  )
 + 12(1 + )(1  )
? 
()  + (1  ) ? 

 +
1
2
(1 + )(1  )

() (1  2)  (1  )

1
2
(   1)

which is true because the l.h.s. of the last expression is non-negative and the r.h.s. is
non-positive.
Thus, the untalented fund company retains the incumbent fund manager if it observes
a positive investment performance, and replaces him otherwise.
Talented fund company. Since the talented fund company only hires good managers,
it always observes 1 > 0 and thus, Pr( = gj1) = 1: As a result, this class of fund
company always retains the good fund manager.
Investors belief . The structure of the investors beliefs is as follows. Possible realiza-
tions of the rst-period net return imply that
Pr( = tj1) =
8>><>>:
0 if 1 < 0

+ 1
2
(1+)(1 ) if 1 > 0
0 if 1 = 0
where
Pr( = tj1 > 0) =
Pr( = t; 1 > 0)
Pr(1 > 0)
=
Pr( = t)
Pr(1 > 0)
=

 + 12(1 + )(1  )
:
Moreover, it is possible to show that Pr( = u; 1 > 0) = 0
10 The investors best
response is to retain if and only if the posterior is higher than the prior probability,
i.e. if
Pr( = tj1)  :
This is only satised by Pr( = tj1 > 0) since

 + 12(1 + )(1  )
? 
() (   1)  (1  );
which is true as the l.h.s. of this expression is non-positive and the r.h.s. is non-negative.
Thus, the investor retains the fund company if it observes a positive result, and replaces
10Since a good (bad) manager generates a positive (negative) expected portfolio return.
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it otherwise.
Fund managers strategy (at t = 1):
Good manager. If he plays a1 = s, he generates a successful return at t = 1, i.e., 1 > 0:
Thus, the good manager is retained and his portfolio again yields a positive return at
t = 2. The total good fund managers total payo¤ corresponds to
g(a = s) = (1 + ) + (2 + ): (5.1)
Notice that expected net returns generated by good managers are given by
E(tjsuccess) = b   (5.2)
Taking expectation(s) on (5.1) and using (5.2) yields
Eg(a = s) = 2 (b  ) + 2 > 0;
which holds as  < b.
Bad manager. At t = 1, he has two possibilities: trade (churn) or no trade. If he does
not trade in the rst period, he is not retained, and then, his payo¤ is
b(a = ) = :
On the other hand, if he trades at t = 1, he successes and fails with the same probability.
The expectation of the net return conditional on no successful trade is given by
E(tjfailure) = b  1   < 0:
Thus, the bad fund managers expected payo¤ corresponds to
Eb(a = f0; 1g) = 1
2
[E(t1jsuccess) + t2] + 1
2
[E(t1jfailure)]
=
1
2
[E(1jsuccess) + 2] +
1
2
[E(1jfailure) + ]
=
1
2
 f(b  ) + (b  1  )g+ 3
2

=  

^
2
+ 

+
3
2
:
Then, the bad manager churns if
Eb(a = f0; 1g) > b(a = ) = ;
which is equivalent to the condition
  =2
^
2 + 
:
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Since  < b, a su¢ cient condition is given by
  :
Traders Pricing Strategy. The probability that the second-period fund manager is good
depends on whether the fund company is talented or untalented in the rst period. In
the rst, case, this probability is one. In the second case, it depends on whether the fund
company hires a good or bad manager in the rst period. Notice that if an untalented
fund company hires a bad manager, it can hire a good manager in the second period if
the bad manager gets a unsuccsessful net return at t = 1. All of this implies that the
probability that the second-period fund manager is good corrresponds to
Pr( = g; t = 2) =  +

 + (1  )1
2


(1  )
=  + (1  )

1 +
1
2
(1  )

We have three kind of managers: second-period managers who trade only if they are
good, rst-period good managers who always trade and churners who randomize with
the same probability between buying and selling. Thus, by symmetry,
Pr ( = gja = 1) = Pr ( = gja = 0) = Pr ( = gja 2 f0; 1g)
Then, a trader who receives a buy or sell order computes the following posterior prob-
ability:
^ = Pr ( = gja 2 f0; 1g)
=
Pr ( = g; a 2 f0; 1g)
Pr (a 2 f0; 1g)
=
Pr ( = g; a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 1) + Pr ( = g; a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 2)
Pr (a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 1) + Pr (a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 2)
Notice that Pr ( = g; a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 1) is given by
Pr ( = g; a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 1j = t) Pr( = t) + Pr ( = g; a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 1j = u) Pr( = u)
=  + (1  )
and Pr ( = g; a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 2) corresponds to
Pr ( = g; a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 2j = t) Pr( = t) + Pr ( = g; a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 2j = u) Pr( = u)
=  + ( + (1  )1
2
)(1  ):
Moreover,
Pr (a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 1) = 1;
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and
Pr (a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 2) = Pr( = g; t = 2)
=  + ( + (1  )1
2
)(1  )
Thus,
^ =
2 + (1  )(2 + 12(1  ))
1 +  + (1  )(1 + 12(1  ))
:
With this probability, the trader computes the next ask price:
p^at = Pr( = gja 2 f0; 1g)E(vj = g; a = 1) + Pr( = bja 2 f0; 1g)E(vj = b; a = 1)
= ^ + (1  ^)1
2
=
1
2
(1 + ^);
and the bid price:
p^bt = Pr( = gja 2 f0; 1g)E(vj = g; a = 0) + Pr( = bja 2 f0; 1g)E(vj = b; a = 0)
= ^0 + (1  ^)1
2
=
1
2
(1  ^):

Proof of Corollary 3.2. The average trading volume is given by
w =
Pr(a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 1) + Pr ( = g; a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 2)
2
where
Pr(a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 1) = 1;
and
Pr ( = g; a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 2) = Pr(a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 2)
= Pr (a 2 f0; 1g ;  = g; t = 2j = t) Pr( = t)
+Pr (a 2 f0; 1g ;  = g; t = 2j = u) Pr( = u)
=  + (1  )( + (1  )
2
):
Hence,
w =
2 + 3   2
4
+
(1  (1 + 1 2 ))
2
:

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Abstract
This paper characterizes the contractual relationship between an external audi-
tor and a manager of a client rm when the incentives for both agents are implicit
as in the career concerns framework. The main result is that the earning man-
agement and the audit e¤ort are decreasing over time because the incentives to
build a reputation also decline for both agents in spite of a managers rst mover
advantage. This suggests that the audit e¤ort should be higher when the auditor
is an emerging rm and the future employment opportunities for the client rms
manager are larger.
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1 Introduction
External auditors are frequently paid according to a scale of fees set for each class of
worker-hours used during the audit, which in turn depends on the ability and/or the
historical productivity of the human resources engaged in the process. Although the
total number of worker-hours can be di¤erent for each client rm according to its size,
the unitary fees are the same for all clients and the fulllment of this plan of hours is
indeed not certied ex post by other agents. Furthermore, the task of the auditor is
considered fully attained with the preparation of a report about the truthfulness or the
veracity of the nancial statements. However, the audit process that constitutes the
background for the opinion contained in this report is seldom evaluated or audited by
a third party.1 All of this means that in practice the audit rm is rewarded in advance
and that its compensation scheme is no contingent neither on the quantity nor on the
quality of the audit e¤ort actually exerted.
Both the no contingent nature of this reward scheme and the lack of monitoring on
the audit activity rise interesting questions about the actual incentives that external
auditors have to do their job properly. The central hypothesis of this paper is that
the answer to this issue seems to come from the prospective opportunities o¤ered to
the auditors by the market. These opportunities can materialize through the incor-
poration of new clients or the renovation of the contracts open with the current ones.
Accordingly, they can be interpreted as implicit and dynamic incentives similar to
those known in contract theory as career concerns.
On the other side of the auditing contract, we have the client rm, and more speci-
cally, its manager. In the context of the audit relationship, the main action undertaken
by the manager concerns the announcement of the companys nancial statements,
which constitutes the major input for the auditors task. Nevertheless, the plenty of
scandals related to the manipulation of these statements observed especially during
the last decade, supports strongly the choice of modelling the managers report as a
non-truthtelling and strategic behavior referred to as earning management. As an im-
portant part of the managers incentives seems to come from his future employment
opportunities, it is reasonable to conjecture that the stimulus of earning management
also stems from his implicit incentives.2 As a consequence, we argue that career con-
cerns also o¤er a suitable approach to explain the main driving force of this managerial
1 In 2002, U.S. Congress past the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX, hereafter), the most important securi-
ties exchange legislation over the last two decades in order to guarantee the transparency in nancial
markets. Nevertheless, there is no law that demands the existence of an independent rm that certies
external auditorreports.
2 In this case, the implicit incentives for the manager are given by perspectives of promotions or
better outside opportunities.
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behavior.
This paper characterizes the contractual relationship between an audit rm and a
client rms manager when the incentives for both agents are implicit. To this end,
starting from a career concerns model in the spirit of Holmström (1999), we innovate
by allowing in each period a sequential game between both parties with a strategic
interaction through their respective disutility functions. In such a game, on the one
side, the leader position is held by the manager, who has to decide about the disclosure
of information on his companys nancial situation through the accounting statements.
On the other side, the auditor observes this signal and has to make a choice about how
much e¤ort he is willing to undertake in order to verify if such a signal represents
reasonably the audited rms nancial position.
Our main nding is that earning management and audit e¤ort are decreasing over
time because the incentives to build a reputation also decline for both agents. However,
as our innovation introduces a new source of (current) incentives for both agents
actions, the increasing lazy behavior of the auditor may be o¤set if his counterpart
is in an earlier stage of its career. As a result, the model predicts a continuum of
cases depending on which stage of their careers contractual parties are, with two polar
cases. On the one side, we have the best scenario from a social point of view, that
is, the case in which the probability of having non-detected earning management is
minimized. Accordingly, our results suggest that auditing e¤orts should be high when
the auditor is an emerging rm and/or the future employment opportunities for the
manager are large. On the other side, our model also predicts the worst scenario
from a social viewpoint, that is, the situation in which the probability of having non-
detected earning management is maximized. In fact, under our double-career-concerns
approach, non-detected earning management actions are expected to be higher as long
as the manager is at a very early stage of his career, and the auditor is an old rm in
the market.
Thus, our model provides an alternative explanation to recent scandals involving
collusion between auditors and managers to manipulate nancial statements in U.S.3
In fact, most of the previous literature has accounted for these scandals based on
the possible conict of interests that audit rms face when providing jointly auditing
and consulting services (see, among others, Antle, 1984; Simunic, 1984; Firth, 1997;
and Ruiz Barbadillo et al., 2006). In contrast, our approach highlights the relevance of
career concerns held by both parties of audit contracts, but focusing only on the auditing
3 These scandals include, among others, Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Imclone and Adelphia. It is
important to note that our model delivers two conditions to be tested when manipulations were per-
formed: (i) if these companies were run by manager teams with large career concerns, and (ii) if these
audit rms were old participants in the market.
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services. Although a multi-task approach can contribute to improve the understanding
of these scandals, this should constitute the aim of future research.
Our analysis also contributes to clarify the incentives behind the relationship among
shareholders, auditors and managers. Under certain circumstances, our theoretical
framework show ine¢ ciencies in the auditing process given the two-sided career concern
framework. This result supports the existence of either an independent rm or an
independent audit committee inside the board that certies the audit process. This
would improve the quality of the information revealed to nancial markets and mitigate
these ine¢ ciencies.
This paper is related to the abundant literature on career concern for executives
(Fama, 1980; Holmström, 1999; and Meyer and Vickers, 1997). However, to the best
of our knowledge, so far this approach has not be used to model the relationship
between an external auditor and a client rm. Furthermore, a two-sided career concern
framework remains almost unexplored within the contract theory literature. One recent
exception is Song and Thakor (2006), who study the relationship between the Chief
Executive O¢ cer (CEO) and the Board of Directors when both of them have implicit
incentives in a career concerns fashion. They contemplate a project selection setting
in which the CEO has the responsibility for generating project ideas and providing
the board with the information necessary to evaluate them. Their main result is that
whereas the boards career concerns cause it to distort its investment recommendation
pro-cyclically, the CEOs career concerns cause her to sometimes reduce the precision
of the boards information. Nevertheless, and in contrast to our paper, this work
does not model the relationship between both parties by means of a strategic and
dynamic interaction. Thus, our paper contributes to the contract theory literature by
exploiting a richer environment that incorporates two innovations: a bilateral career
concern setting, and a rst-mover advantage for one the career-concerned agents (the
manager).
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 constructs a career concerns model of
audit contract in the spirit of Holmström (1999), but with a sequential game played by
the auditor and the manager in each period. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium
of the game and discusses the principal results. Finally, Section 4 concludes and points
up some limitations and extensions. All the proofs are contained in the Appendix.
2 The Model
In this section we characterize the relationship between three agents with innite hori-
zon: an audit rm, the manager of a client rm, and the market.
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2.1 The manager
The client rms manager decides about the announcement of a signal that we sum-
marize as xt, the account earnings in period t, and whose technology is dened as
follows
xt =  + at + t 8t = 1; 2; :::: (2.1)
where  represents some managerial characteristic like talent or ability which is un-
known not only for the market but also for the manager. However, all agents share
the same prior distribution of this managerial ability described by
  N(m1; 1
h1
);
where m1  E() and h1  1=V () corresponds to the level of precision of . Moreover,
at 2 R represents the level of earning management chosen by the manager at period t
. Finally, t is a stochastic noise term which is independent and identically distributed
as follows
t  N(0; 1
h"
);
where h" corresponds to the level of precision of ".
We assume that the manager is risk neutral and exhibits the following separable
utility function
UM (c; a) =
1X
t=1
t 1[ct   g(at; et)]; (2.2)
where ct > 0 is the consumption at period t and g(:) is an increasing and convex function
in at that represents the disutility of earning management actions to the manager. In
addition, g(:) depends on et, the current auditing e¤ort decision made by the auditor,
what we will detail later. For now, we suppose that g(:) is an increasing and convex
function in et. This reects the idea that the earning management actions are more
costly when the level of anticipated auditing e¤orts are large because in this case it is
more di¢ cult to fool the auditor. Furthermore, we assume that the marginal disutility
of the managerial actions is increasing in the auditing e¤ort. All these assumptions can
be summarized as follows
ga(:)  @g(:)
@at
> 0; gaa(:)  @ga(:)
@at
> 0;
ge(:)  @g(:)
@et
> 0; gee(:)  @ge(:)
@et
> 0;
gae(:)  @ga(:)
@et
> 0:
The earning management decision has two objectives. The rst one has a current
e¤ect and the second one has a long run e¤ect. First, we assume that in each period
Audit Contracts and Reputation 6
the manager and the auditor play a sequential game in which the manager exhibits a
rst movers advantage. Thus, in each period t, the manager chooses a level of at, and
according to (??) also a signal xt, with the aim of inuencing the e¤ort level exerted
by the auditor in this period. Since the auditor only observes xt, we need to assume
that the level of earnings announced by the manager is a goodsignal for the level of
earning management actions in the sense of that the joint density f(x; a) satises the
monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP).4
Second, the manager decides a level of earning management as a try to inuence,
through the signal xt, the learning process of the market about the managerial ability .
As in the career concerns literature, the link between the past managerial decision and
the unknown managerial characteristic is given by the prospective incomes of top exec-
utives. These may be associated to future employment opportunities for the manager
given by promotions or better outside opportunities. In consequence, we assume that
the incomes associated to future employment opportunities for the manager depend
on the past realizations of the signal xt. This signal in turn depends stochastically on
the managers past decisions about at as pointed out by equation (??). We summarize
these future incomes in the wage function wt(xt 1) that represents the wage paid in
period t based on the vector xt 1 = (x1; :::xt 1). This vector represents a sequence of
realizations of the signal x up to time t  1, what we call history of x.
Since there are a double causality between today earning management actions and
future wages, both the decision rule at(:) and the wage functions wt(:) are determined
simultaneously in equilibrium.
2.2 The Auditor
Since we assume that the audit rm is managed by its owner, we do not distinguish
between the audit rms manager and the audit rm itself, and thus hereafter we
only talk generically about the auditor. The auditor must elaborate a report with his
opinion about the thruthfulness of the signal xt disclosed by the manager. We model
this situation as a new signal rt, the adjusted earnings report at period t, that is, a
number that depends stochastically on the audit e¤orts in the following fashion:
rt = + et + t 8t = 1; 2; :::: (2.3)
where  represents some auditors characteristic like ability or productivity which is
unknown not only for the market and the client rm but also for the auditor. However,
4That is, we assume that fa(x; a) > 0 and that
@
@x

fa(x; a)
f(x; a)

> 0:
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all agents share the following prior distribution of the auditors ability
  N(n1; 1
k1
);
where n1  E() and k1  1=V () corresponds to the level of precision of . In
addition, et  0 represents the level of auditing e¤ort chosen by the auditor at period
t. Finally, t is a stochastic noise term which is independent and identically distributed
as follows
t  N(0;
1
k
);
where k corresponds to the level of precision of .
The auditor is risk neutral and has the following separable utility function
UA( ; e) =
1X
t=1
t 1[ t    (et; xt)] (2.4)
where  t 2 R represents the auditors income at period t and  (:) is an increasing and
convex function in et that measures the disutility of the auditing e¤ort. The function
 (:) also depends on xt, the current signal announced by the manager. We assume
that  (:) is an increasing and convex function in xt. This assumption is based on the
idea that the auditing e¤ort is more costly as long as the level of earning management
actions, underlying in higher level of xt, is larger. This is because it is more di¢ cult for
the auditor to detect a cheating behavior.5 Moreover, we suppose that the marginal
disutility of the auditing e¤ort is decreasing in the signal announced by the manager.
In sum, we are assuming the following situation
 e(:) 
@ (:)
@et
> 0;  ee(:) 
@ e(:)
@et
> 0;
 x(:) 
@ (:)
@xt
> 0;  xx(:) 
@ x(:)
@xt
> 0;
 ex(:) 
@ e(:)
@xt
< 0:
As in the case of the manager, the auditing e¤ort decision has two objectives. Again,
there is one objective that has a current e¤ect and another which has a long run e¤ect.
First, in each period t, the auditor chooses a decision rule (s reaction function) of et,
and according to (2.3) also a signal rt. Since the manager has a rst movers advantage,
he can anticipate this decision rule, which implies nally that the auditor can inuence
the level of earning management actions undertaken by the manager in this period
through the disutility function g(at; et).
In addition, the auditor also decides a level of auditing e¤ort as an attempt to
inuence, through the signal rt, the markets future perception about . In this case,
5Again, the assumption of MLRP is crucial for this fact to be held.
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the underlying driving force that permits the relationship between the past decision
about et and the unknown auditors characteristic  are his implicit incentives. These
career concern-based incentives are given by the auditors incomes associated to the
prospective opportunities arisen from contracts with new clients, and/or the renova-
tion of relationships maintained with some current clients. Thus, we assume that these
incomes depend on the past realizations of the signal rt, which in turn depend stochas-
tically on the auditors past decisions about et as (2.3) establishes.6 We summarize
these future opportunities in the income function  t(rt 1) that represents the incomes
obtained in period t based on the vector rt 1 = (r1; :::rt 1). This vector describes the
history of the signal r up to time t  1.
Given the interaction between today auditing e¤orts and future incomes, both the
decision rule et(:) and the income functions  t(:) are determined simultaneously in
equilibrium.
2.3 The Market
We suppose that the future opportunities for both the manager and the auditor depend
on the assessment of their abilities made by the market. This is an abstract agent who
gathers all available information concerning not only the signals disclosed by the other
two agents in previous periods, but also is able to anticipate perfectly the decision rule
chosen by them in all periods. These two sources of information are though not enough
to reveal fully the realization of the random variables  and . Thus, the market can
only to improve its perception of these unknown characteristics over time through the
following learning processes.
For the managerial ability, given the assumptions made on normality and inde-
pendence, the markets learning process is characterized by the following posterior
distribution7
 j xt  N(mt+1; 1
ht+1
)
with
mt+1  E( j xt) = htmt + hzt
ht + h
=
h1m1 + h"
Pt
s=1 zs
h1 + th
; (2.5)
ht+1  1=V ( j xt) = ht + h = h1 + th; and (2.6)
zt  xt   at (xt 1) (2.7)
6Now we assume implicitly that fe(r; e) > 0 and that the level of reported adjusted earnings rt is
a "good" signal for the level of auditing e¤ort in the sense of that the joint density f(r; e) satises the
MLRP dened as follows
@
@r

fe(r; e)
f(r; e)

> 0:
7See DeGroot (1970).
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Notice that the mean process fmtg is a random walk with incremental variance which
declines to zero as t!1, which means that in the limit  will become fully known.
The intuition of this learning process is that at period t the market observes the
earnings xt announced by the manager, but the former lters this public signal through
the perfect inference of the optimal decision rule at . In other words, the manager tries
to manipulate the earnings in order to inuence the markets posterior perception about
his managerial ability, and in this way, to a¤ect his future wages. However, we assume
that in equilibrium the market is able to anticipate perfectly this cheating behavior
and improve the signal received. This improved signal is denoted by zt, which however
does not reveal fully the realization of the managerial ability because it still keeps a
source of noise arisen from the term t.8
On the auditor side, the markets learning process on the auditing ability is char-
acterized by the following posterior distribution9
 j rt  N(nt+1; 1
kt+1
)
with
nt+1  E( j rt) = ktnt + klt
kt + k
=
k1n1 + k
Pt
s=1 ls
k1 + tk
; (2.8)
kt+1  1=V ( j rt) = kt + k = k1 + tk; and (2.9)
lt  rt   et (rt 1; xt ) (2.10)
As in the case of the managerial ability, the mean process of the audit ability fntg is
also a random walk with incremental precision that diverges as t!1. Hence, in the
limit  also becomes completely known.
The intuition behind of this learning process is the following one. At period t; the
market observes the adjusted earning report rt disclosed by the auditor, but the former
improves this public signal anticipating perfectly the optimal decision rule chosen by
the latter concerning to the level of auditing e¤ort. Despite the auditors attempts to
inuence the markets assessment of his ability and his future incomes, we assume that
in equilibrium the market cannot be confused by the auditors decision. Consequently,
the market constructs an improved signal denoted by lt, which still contains a noisy
element t that prevents to know perfectly the realization of the auditing characteristic
.10
An illustration of the timing of the game is given by the following gure when
T = 2:
8 In fact, from (2.1) and (2.7) we know that zt =  + t, and hence, ztjxt 1  N(mt; 1ht + 1h ).
9See DeGroot (1970).
10 In fact, from (2.3) and (2.10) we known that lt = + t, and thus, ltjrt 1  N(nt; 1kt + 1k ).
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3 Characterization of the Equilibrium
According to the timing of the problem, the managers optimal decision at (xt 1; rt 1)
and the auditors optimal decision et (rt 1; xt ) are the result of a sequential game
played by both agents at period t: In this game, the manager exhibits a rst movers
advantage. In consequence, we need to apply backward induction in each period, which
means to characterize the solution of this game as a problem with two stages.
Likewise, since we assume that the agents are risk neutral and forward looking
for innite periods, and that there is neither borrowing nor saving, this problem can
be written as a dynamic program at t = 1. In this formulation, the agents choose a
sequence of actions that maximizes their expected utilities and characterizes the path
of sub-perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of this game.11 Furthermore, we assume that
shareholders assess both managers ability and auditors productivity inside each of
both competitive labor markets. This means that shareholders are the principals in
the two agency relationships. In addition, we restrict our model to the case when all
the bargaining power is on the agents hands in both markets.
11The assumption that there is neither saving nor borrowing for the manager means that ct = wt
for all t. Notice that this assumption implies that we do not need to assume that the capital market
is perfect.
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Since the relevant variables are functions of the history of the signals r and x -
unknown at time t = 1-, we apply the unconditional expectation to the objective
functions. Finally, all this leads us to the problem described by the following two
steps.
I. The Auditors Problem. For a given sequence of random variables fxtg1t=1,
which has implicit a sequence of managers actions fatg1t=1, the auditor chooses the
non-stochastic sequence of reaction functions

et(r
t 1; xt)
	1
t=1
that solves the following
program:
max
fet(:)g1t=1
EUA( ; e) =
1X
t=1
t 1[E t(rt 1)  E (et(rt 1); xt)] (3.1)
s:t:
 t(r
t 1) = E(rt j rt 1) = E( j rt 1) + et(rt 1) 8t = 1; 2; ::: (3.2)
where constraint (3.2) represents the auditors incomes that a competitive and risk
neutral principal sets in each period t. Notice that we assume that the prospective
incomes for the auditor depend on the level of past reported adjusted earnings rt 1.
This modelling choice is based on the idea that the external auditor are hired directly
by the shareholders or other body autonomous of the manager such as the board of
directors or the controller of the company. This justies that we can model the future
opportunities the market o¤ers to the auditor as dependent on his adjusted earnings
report.
II. The Managers Problem. Taking into account the sequence of non-
stochastic reaction functions

et(r
t 1; xt)
	1
t=1
, the manager chooses the sequence of
non-stochastic earning management actions

at (xt 1; rt 1)
	1
t=1
, which in turn deter-
mines the sequence of random signals fxt g1t=1 so that
max
fat(:)g1t=1
EUM (w; a) =
1X
t=1
t 1[Ewt(xt 1)  Eg(at(xt 1); et(rt 1; xt))] (3.3)
s:t:
wt(x
t 1) = E(xt j xt 1) = E( j xt 1) + at(xt 1) 8t = 1; 2; ::(3.4)
where now constraint (3.4) represents the managerial wages that a competitive and risk
neutral principal sets in each period t. Thus, the prospective incomes for the auditor
depend on the level of earnings announced by the manager in the past. In this contract,
the principals are the shareholders or the board of directors, who are assumed to be
autonomous of the manager.
The next statement characterizes the equilibrium of this game.
Proposition 3.1. The equilibrium of the game described by the auditors and the
managers problem is characterized by the vector of sequences f(at ; et (xt ); wt ; t )g1t=1.
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In this equilibrium,

at (xt 1; rt 1); et (rt 1; xt )
	1
t=1
represents the sequence of
non-stochastic SPNE proles of the game played between the manager and the auditor
at each period. Moreover, fxt g1t=1 denotes the sequence of random signals announced
by the manager when he decides to exert the sequence of optimal earning management
actions fat g1t=1. Finally, wt and t represent the wage sequences of the manager and
the auditor, respectively.
Notice that the principal anticipates perfectly the SPNE prole (at ; et (xt )) and
uses these correct conjectures to lter the signals disclosed by both the manager and
the auditor. This implies that the market uses signals zt 1 and lt 1 instead xt 1 and
rt 1, respectively. All this together with the learning processes described by (2.6) and
(2.9) allow to write the constraints of the problem as follows
 t(r
t 1) = nt(lt 1) + et (r
t 1; xt ) 8t = 1; 2; :::: (3.5)
and
wt(x
t 1) = mt(zt 1) + at (x
t 1; rt 1) 8t = 1; 2; :::: (3.6)
where zt 1 = (z1; :::zt 1) and lt 1 = (l1; :::lt 1). Taking expectations on (3.5), with
auditing e¤ort xed and non-contingent, yields
E t(r
t 1) = Ent(lt 1) + Eet (r
t 1; xt ) 8t = 1; 2; ::::
=
k1n1
kt
+
k
kt
t 1X
s=1
[n1 + es   Ees(rs 1; xs)] + Eet (rt 1; xt ) (3.7)
Hence, for a non-stochastic equilibrium path of auditing e¤orts

et (rt 1; xt )
	1
t=1
, the
marginal return to es in period t for all s < t does not depend on the past because
@E t(r
t 1)
@es
=
k
kt
 t (3.8)
A similar line of reasoning for the managers problem leads to the marginal return to
as in period t for all s < t does not depend on the past neither since
@Ewt(x
t 1)
@as
=
h
ht
 t: (3.9)
Thus, the next lemma states a useful property concerning marginal returns to both
agentsactions for characterizing the equilibrium.
Lemma 3.2. The present value of the marginal return to both auditing e¤ort and
earning management is decreasing over time.
On the side of costs, note that the marginal expected cost to es is equal to 	(es),
the expected marginal cost to es so that
@E (es; xs)
@es
= E 0e(es; xs)  	(es; xs):
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Moreover, the marginal expected cost to managerial actions as is given by
g0a(a

t ; e

t (x

t )):
After combining the properties of marginal returns and marginal disutility, the follow-
ing proposition characterizes the major feature of the equilibrium path of both parties
actions.
Proposition 3.3. The optimal level of auditing e¤ort and earning management de-
creases over time.
Let us explain the intuition of this result for the auditor case. As long as the audi-
tors career elapses -the managers career ceteris paribus-, his auditing e¤ort exhibits
a decreasing (present value of) marginal return and an increasing marginal disutility.
Since only the incremental disutility depends on e¤ort, the only way to maintain the
marginal condition of optimality is by means of decreasing auditing actions. Notice
that it is crucial for the auditor exert less e¤ort over time since his incentives to build
a reputation also decline. In fact, the learning process on the precision of his ability
described by expression (2.9) means that the uncertainty about the auditing ability,
1=kt, goes to zero. As a consequence, the implicit incentives provided by futures oppor-
tunities for the auditor are dissipated over time and thereby, auditing actions become
useless.
It is important to point out that this analysis is true for a given level of optimal
announced earnings xt , that is, assuming that the managers career is xed. Neverthe-
less, as Proposition 3.3 establishes, when t!1 for the manager, earning management
actions at also go to zero. Accordingly, the optimal signal xt declines in a stochastic
sense because. Note that the assumption  ex(:) < 0 guarantees that the marginal
disutility function to the auditing e¤ort shifts in when t!1 for the manager. Thus,
this also drives the level of optimal auditing e¤ort to zero even in cases in which the
auditor be in early stages of his career and his marginal return be far away from zero.
All this implies directly the following result.
Corollary 3.4. For a given level of prospective opportunities for the audit, he will
spent lower e¤ort when he faces a manager with lower career concerns incentives.
Proposition 3.3 also states that nancial statement manipulations decrease over
time as the incentives to build a reputation for the manager decline as well. Again, these
implicit incentives disappear because of the uncertainty about the managerial ability
vanishes as the managers career passes. According to (2.1), this induces stochastically
a smaller xt over time, which, as we discussed above, has e¤ects on auditing e¤ort
decisions.
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Furthermore, we can observe from the marginal optimality conditions of the audi-
tors problem that when t!1, and for a given level of optimal signal xt , the optimal
auditing e¤ort et goes to zero. The assumption gae(:) > 0 implies that the marginal
disutility function to the managerial action shifts out when t ! 1 for the auditor,
which increases the level of optimal earning management. This suggests that a con-
tractual relationship with an auditor with low career concerns could o¤set the lack of
incentives by the manager to manipulate nancial statements when he is at the last
stages of his career and the marginal return to these actions is small. The next result
follows then directly.
Corollary 3.5. For a given level of prospective opportunities for the manager, he will
follow higher earning management actions when he faces an auditor with lower career
concerns incentives.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper characterizes the contractual relationship between an auditor and a client
rms manager when the incentives for both parties are implicit as in the career con-
cerns literature. Our results are twofold. First, earning management and auditing
e¤ort are decreasing over time as the present value of the marginal return to these
actions is also decreasing, and thus, incentives to build a reputation decline for both
agents. Second, as a result of a strategic interaction between the auditor and the
manager through their disutility functions, the actions undertaken by each agent in a
given period are additionally inuenced by the current actions or signals chosen by his
counterpart.
As a consequence, the combination of these two ndings suggests that the e¤ort
exerted by each agent will depend not only on the incentives provided by his own
career concerns, but also on the implicit incentives of his counterpart. This implies,
on the one hand, that audit e¤ort in a given period should be higher when the auditor
is an emerging rm and/or the future employment opportunities for the client rms
manager are larger. On the other hand, one should expect that earning management
actions be higher as long as the prospective opportunities for the manager are larger
and/or the auditor is an older rm in the market.
Two key underlying assumptions allow these results to emerge. First, we suppose
that markets learning processes of both managerial talent and auditor ability are
so that uncertainty about these abilities vanishes over time. Hence, the usefulness
of actions undertaken and signals disclosed by agents is also dissipated. Second, we
model the manager-auditor relationship in each period as a sequential game in which
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the strategic interaction is provided through the e¤orts disutility functions of both
agents. Thus, the assumptions made in connection with the cross-e¤ects of actions
and signals on the marginal disutilities are crucial to obtain the second result.
All this suggests some extensions that could jeopardize the robustness of the con-
clusions attained here. The rst one is the inclusion of a learning process in which
ability follows a noisy process and thus, varies over time. Since this additional noise
prevents that ability can be known with full precision, the sequence of optimal e¤orts
could not be necessarily decreasing over time. The second avenue of extensions is mod-
elling the manager-auditor relationship under other frameworks, either by modifying
the nature and timing of the game played between both agents or by considering other
strategic interaction links between them.
Finally, a third line of future research is to take into account di¤erent types of
auditing e¤orts. This extension is especially relevant if one considers that in practice
audit testing is typically categorized according to the type of risk that auditor faces:
inherent risk, control risk and detection risk. In this sense, the extension of our model
to a multi-task career concerns environment à la Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999)
seems pertinent. This could be a good starting point for examining how any comple-
mentarity and substitutability between these three class of auditing activities could
a¤ect the strength of implicit incentives.
5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Substituting the solution

at (xt 1; rt 1)
	1
t=1
of the
Managers Problem into the accounting earnings process given by (2.1), we obtain the
sequence of optimal random signals fxt g1t=1. Then, incorporating this sequence in
the reaction function et(:) described by (3.2), we get the sequence of non-stochastic
optimal auditing e¤orts

et (rt 1; xt )
	1
t=1
. Similarly, after substituting the last
sequence into the audit earnings report process described by (2.3), the sequence of
optimal random reports frt g1t=1 is attained. Next, plugging sequences at and xt into
(2.5) allows us to get the conditional expectations of . A similar substitution of
et and rt into (2.8) yields the conditional expectation of . Finally, replacing all of
these previous sequences into constraints (3.2) and (3.4) allows us to nd the vector
of salary sequences fwt ; t g1t=1. 
Proof of Lemma 3.2. From (3.8), let us dene t, the present value of the
marginal return to auditing e¤ort at period t, as follows
t =
1X
s=t
s ts, 8t = 1; 2; :::: (5.1)
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Similarly, using (3.9), dene t, the present value of the marginal return to earning
management at period t, as
t =
1X
s=t
s ts, 8t = 1; 2; :::: (5.2)
Given the learning processes about the precision ht and kt described by expres-
sions (2.6) and (2.9), both sequences t and t converge to zero as t ! 1. Hence,
and since  < 1, t and t decline in turn to zero as t!1, which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. First, the rst-order condition to the auditors prob-
lem, evaluated at the equilibrium path, is given by
t =
1X
s=t
s ts = 	(e

t ; x

t ) 8t = 1; 2; ::::
From Lemma 3.2, t is a declining sequence as t ! 1. Moreover, the function 	(:)
is increasing in et as, by assumption,  (:) is a convex function in et. This implies that
for a given level of optimal announced earnings xt , the equilibrium level of auditing
e¤ort decreases over time.
Second, the rst-order condition to the managers problem, evaluated at the equi-
librium path, corresponds to
t =
1X
s=t
s ts = g0a(a

t ; e

t (x

t )) 8t = 1; 2; :::: (5.3)
Lemma 3.2 implies that t is a declining sequence as t!1 for the manager. Finally,
the convexity of the function g(:) with respect to at ensures that, for a given level of
auditing e¤ort, the optimal level of earnings management at decreases over time. 
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